Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses R&D incentives when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to every receiving firm. We concentrate on a two stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that R&D incentives can be larger with spillovers under incomplete information.
Introduction
Spillovers of R&D results are common phenomena in industries. Spillover, in most general terms, depicts a situation where there is intentional or unintentional leakage of the R&D results of a firm to other firms in within or across industries. There is a large literature to show that the possibility of knowledge spillovers affects the R&D decisions of a firm. In presence of spillovers, firms tend to underinvest in R&D (see for instance Katz (1986) , d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et.al. (1992) , and Suzumura (1992) ). Perhaps that is why firms get very often involved in race for winning patents in order to secure their R&D output. Patent race is also widely studied in the R&D literature (e.g. Shapiro (1985) , Baye and Hoppe (2003) , Baker and Mezetti (2005) etc.).
However, it may not always be possible to get patent for every innovation. Also an innovation has to pass through multiple rounds of examination so as to ascertain that the innovation is indeed an original one and it does not have "substantial" overlapping with any prior patented innovation 1 . Thus even if it is possible to obtain a patent,getting a patent involves time. If obtaining a patent takes a longer bit of time, then by the time the patent is obtained, it may not serve the purpose of protecting the benefits of the innovation as other competing innovations may have come into being in the mean time. Another important fact is that even when patents are available they are imperfectly enforced and even when a patent is infringed, proving the case is a lengthy process.
Therefore, when patents are either not available or are not effective enough to prevent appropriation of R&D benefits by other firms, incentives of an innovating firm to undertake R&D activities decline, and hence firms tend to underinvest in R&D both from industry and social point of view (Conti (2014) ). Ornaghi (2006) has drawn attention to the existence of a possible gap between private and social rates of return of R&D; this reflects insufficient appropriability from R&D investments. That a firm benefits from R&D of their rivals is also evident in Jaffe (1986) which provides empirical evidence of the presence of spillovers. and Zander (1992) ). This in turn determines the extent of spillovers of an innovation to be enjoyed by a firm. However, these absorptive capacities, determined endogenously can very well be privately known to the concerned firms. How much spillovers would occur for an innovation is likely to be a variable determining investment of an R&D firm. Thus in the presence of spillovers firms decide whether to invest in R&D or not depending on what information they have about their rivals' abilities of benefiting from spillovers of their R&D knowledge. Therefore this paper makes an attempt to study the R&D incentive of a firm in a duopoly under different information scenarios where spillover of R&D knowledge is involuntary and automatic. We term the proportion of the R&D output that gets spilled over to a firm from its rival firm is its spillover parameter. Each firm in our framework is always aware of its own spillover parameter, but it may or may not know the spillover parameter of its rival since the ability to benefit from spillover of knowledge from other sources depends largely on endogenous factors of a firm and these factors may not be observable to outsiders. Accordingly, we are in regime of complete information. When every firm knows its own as well as its rival's spillover parameters, we have a complete information framework. When a firm can only observe its own spillover parameter but not of the rival's, we are in an incomplete information scenario. In case of incomplete information, thus, the spillover parameters constitute types of the firms.
This paper considers general distribution function of firm types.
Impact of spillovers on R&D incentives in a complete information framework is quite well looked at in the literature. Reinganum (1981) an incomplete information framework. Here, both the firms try to develop a prototype, and once it is developed, they decide when to introduce the new product. The firms differ in terms of their R&D abilities and thus the earliest date at which a prototype can be created varies across firms. This earliest date is private information to every firm.
Whichever firm succeeds in developing the prototype first takes away the whole profit. The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the model setup.
sections 3 and 4 elaborate the complete information scenario in absence and presence of R&D spillovers respectively, section 5 elaborates on the incomplete information scenario, section 6 compares the threshold values of the spillover parameter under alternative information scenarios and section 7 concludes the paper.
Model Setup
We consider a Cournot duopoly. Note that
2 The average value of y given that y lies between x and D. 3 The intuition is that Ψ(x) must lie between x and D. ). Similar notation will be used for other cases.
Our objective is to find out how the decision of performing the research is dependent on the type of a firm and the level of information available to it. So it is a two stage game. In the first stage each of the firms is deciding whether to invest in research. And in the second stage they are competing in the after-market.
Complete information: No Spillover
If a firm invests in research then its marginal cost is c − D, otherwise it is c.
Lemma 1. The following statements hold:
• If none of the firms invests in research then each one has a profit of Π(0).
• If both of them invest in research then each one has a profit of Π(D) − H.
• 
Proposition 1. The following statements hold:
• Both of them will invest in research if
• None of the will invest in research if
≤ H.
• Only one of them will invest in research if
. 4 4 The model does not predict which of the firms will invest in research in this scenario.
We assume in this section that everything is common knowledge, including the types of the firms. Since we are considering duopoly, at equilibrium three cases can happen:
(1) both the firms invest in R&D, (2) none of the firms invests in R&D and (3) 
if the rival firm is doing the research then the firm i will do the research if and only if Π (D) ≥ Π (2d i − D) + H that is if and only if
6 So a firm will definitely invest in research if and only if magnitude of spillover for both the firms is "sufficiently" small.
Note that if H >
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then both of the firms will never do research simultaneously.
In this case either none of them will invest in research or only one of them will invest in
then none of them will invest in research.
The comparison of the complete information with and without spillovers reveals that spillover educes incentives to perform R&D as stated in the following proposition. 5 The intution is that if the type of the rival is "sufficiently" small then by doing research the firm will earn higher profit, since the spillover effect is small. 6 If the type of the firm is "sufficiently" small then it is better for the firm to invest in research, since the spillover effect is small. 7 Our model does not predict which one of the firms will invest in research in this particular case.
Proposition 2. R&D incentives are lower under spillovers in complete information
framework.
Incomplete Information
In this section we consider the incomplete information problem, hence we assume that d i is private information to firm i. Note that each firm knows its type before it is deciding on R&D investment. Since R&D decision is taken at the first stage, therefore, at the beginning of the production stage, each firm knows whether its rival has has invested in R&D or not. Suppose δ is the threshold value such that a firm will invest in research if and only if its type is less than or equal to δ. Given the cost of the research (i.e. H ), our primary objective in this section is to find out δ.
Like the case of complete information we start our analysis by finding out the (expected) payoffs of firms under different situations. The following lemma derives the (expected) profits.
Lemma 3. • If both of them have not invested in research then each of them gets
• If both of them have invested in research then they both get
• Suppose firm A does the research and firm B does not.
Proof. The expected profit of firm A is given by
and that of firm B is
The corresponding reaction functions are
Solving the two reaction functions stated above we get
and
The rest of the proof is trivial.
If firm i is doing research and it does not know whether firm j is doing research or not, then its expected profit is
On the other hand if firm i is not doing research and it does not know whether firm j is doing research or not, then its expected profit is
Let T (x; δ) denote the gross opportunity gain from doing research when the type of the firm is x. Then T (x; δ) can be defined as
Note that T (x; δ) is decreasing in x. Also,
and with slight abuse of notation let
. Finally, δ must satisfy the following equation
As stated above our objective is to find out δ as a function of H. However, note that till now there is nothing that tells us that for a particular H there will be a unique δ.
The following lemma ensures the uniqueness.
Lemma 4. T (x; x) is strictly decreasing in (0, D).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The following proposition states the conditions for pooling and separating equilibria. The uniqueness of δ given H in the third result is straight from the above lemma.
Since, in the second stage firms are informed about the R&D decision of the rival, this information acts as a signal. So, it is important now to check the incentive compatibility.
We claim above that a firm will invest in R&D if and only if the type of the firm is less than or equal to δ. Suppose firm A follows this strategy and believes firm B to be also following the same strategy. Firm B knows firms A's strategy and belief. We can have the following observations as stated in the remarks below.
Remark. Suppose firm B's type is greater than δ but it decides to invest in R&D. Here from the second stage onwards firm A believes that the type of the firm B is less than δ.
So, firm A will produce accordingly.
So the expected profit of firm B is
However, if it had not invested, then its expected profit would have been
From the definition of δ and since T (x; δ) is strictly decreasing in x, we know that for all d B > δ the following holds:
So, if firm B's type is greater than δ, then given firm A's strategy and belief, it will never invest in research.
Remark. Suppose firm B's type is less than or equal to δ but it decides not to invest in 8 Note that the value of δ depends on the value of H.
R&D.
Here from the second stage onwards firm A believes that the type of the firm B is greater than δ. So, firm A will produce accordingly.
However, if it had invested then its expected profit would have been
Again from the definition of δ and since T (x; δ) is strictly decreasing in x, we know that for all d B ≤ δ the following holds:
So, if firm B's type is less than or equal to δ then, given firm A's strategy and belief, it will always invest in research.
By optimal strategy under incomplete information we mean that the firm will invest in R&D if and only if the type is less than or equal to δ and believes that the rival is following the same strategy. The above two remarks show that given that the rival is following the optimal strategy mentioned above, it is always optimal for a firm to follow the same strategy. So, both the firms following this strategy is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Below we illustrate our findings with an example. . Firm i is indifferent between investing and not investing in research iff
holds. Therefore, δ ≈ 0.5107. If research cost is more than 2.917 then no firm will invest in research. On the other hand if there is no research cost then both the firms will always invest in research.
Comparison of Threshold Values
To compare the results under incomplete information and complete information, we basically need to compare the threshold values under these two situations. It is important to note that in case of complete information the threshold value depends on the type of the rival firm, whereas in case of incomplete information it does not. So to compare we must first fix the type of the rival firm.
We consider the following two examples. Our results show that whether under complete information the firms will invest more in R&D as compared to the situation of incomplete information, cannot be stated unambiguously. The parametric values for which spillovers encourage R&D investments support De Bondt's (1997) analysis and our result is thus a generalisation of the incentive creating effects of spillovers in an incomplete information framework.
Here we have considered success to be a definite outcome of R&D. However, there might be associated uncertainties that might be incorporated in the framework of the model. Further research can be done in this direction to identify the conditions for higher R&D incentives for firms in presence of spillover as well as uncertainties in R&D under various information structures.
A Proof of Proposition 4
9T (x; x) = (1 − F (x))[K 2 + 2K(2D − Ψ(x)) + (2D − Ψ(x))
Now it can be easily seen that
9T (x; x) < 0. This completes the proof.
